1/18/2023 0 Comments Earman stultifying![]() ![]() The blue portion will also be closer to 1 as the denominator of the ratio (the orange portion) is closer to 0. The blue portion will be closer to 1 as the numerator (the green and red portions) are closer themselves to 1. ![]() The closer the blue portion is to 1, the greater the probability that a miracle (‘M’) occurred. First is the obvious point that this equation is a ratio. This review may therefore be read provisionally as “This is how things appear to someone who is familiar with, but far from an expert on, Bayes theorem.”īefore proceeding to Hume’s argument, a few features about Equation 1 should be noted. I should stress before proceeding that while I am familiar with Bayes Theorem, I am hardly an expert. In words, the equation can be read as follows: the probability that there is a miracle, given that we have testimony of a miracle (blue portion) is equal to the probability that there would be testimony of a miracle when a miracle occurred (green portion) times the prior probability of there being a miracle (red portion) divided by the prior probability that there would be testimony of a miracle (orange portion). To make things a bit more intuitive, I color coded the different sections of the equation. Put into Bayesian terms, this can be expressed as follows: In other words, we should possess absolute certainty that the next occurrence will not be a violation of our presumed law of nature. This yields the conclusion that we should assign the likelihood that the next A will also be a B to 1. On JE’s reading of Hume, this makes the statement ‘All As are Bs’ a presumptive law of nature. Further stipulate that in all known instances of A, it turns out that A was also B. Say we have seen a long succession of some event A occurring. JE argues that the most reasonable reading of Hume’s argument against miracles is as follows. JE poses a couple of criteria for an adequate epistemology-criteria which, he feels, Hume’s account of induction cannot meet. JE takes some pains to stress that his critique derives from what he sees as objective flaws in Hume’s argument and not from an antipathy to Hume’s conclusions. In Hume’s Abject Failure, John Earman (henceforth JE) levels several complaints against Hume’s argument against miracles, of which I will focus on only one: Hume’s treatment of inductive reasoning. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |